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1942] NOTES
utes are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee 28 and,
had the court been called upon, to determine whether the limita-
tion was that of prescription or peremption, the wording of the
provision in question could easily have sustained its interpreta-
tion as an ordinary prescriptive limitation.24
G.R.J.
PRESCRIPTION-QUAE TEMPORALIA-EXCEPTION OF REDHIBITORY
DEFECTS-Suit was instituted for the balance due on a promissory
note given in payment for an electric refrigerator and a cook
stove. Defendant, admitting that the note represented the amount
due on the two sales, alleged that the stove failed to live up to
the warranty as it had constantly given him trouble since the first
day it was installed, and he prayed for a rescission of the sale of
the stove. Although no plea of prescription was filed by the plain-
tiff and the court said that it could not supply it, the court inti-
mated that, since more than three years had lapsed since the
purchase, it was too late to file a reconventional demand based on
a redhibitory defect. Passman v. Dawkins, 6 So. (2) 73 (La. App.
1941).
As early as 18231 the Louisiana Supreme Court announced
the rule of law consecrated by the well-known maxim quae tem-
poralia sunt ad agendum perpetua sunt ad excipiendum of early
Roman law.2 In old Roman law, all actions generally speaking
were perpetual and only in some a certain term was specified.3 In
La. Act 39 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2062.1] (interruption by filing suit).
In a supplemental brief, plaintiff conceded that this act had no application
and urged Art. 3518, La. Civil Code of 1870 (interruption by citation).
23. "The judge shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence or by
technical rules or [of] procedure other than herein provided .... The judge
shall decide the merits of the controversy as equitably, summarily and sim-
ply as may be." (Italics supplied.) La. Act 20 of 1914, § 18(4) [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 4408(4)]. Numerous decisions present the view that the statute is
to be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose. See Clark v.
Alexandria Cooperage & Lbr. Co., 157 La. 135, 102 So. 96 (1924); Hinton v.
Louisiana Central Lbr. Co., 148 So. 478 (La. App. 1933); Dodd v. Lakeview
Motors, Inc., 149 So. 278 (La. App. 1933); Terry v. Sparco Oil Corp., 150 So.
391 (La. App. 1934); Burk v. Gulf Refining Co. of La., 171 So. 155 (La. App.
1936).
24. Compare Ray v. Liberty Industrial Life Ins. Co., 180 So. 855 (La.
App. 1938), noted in (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 312.
1. Thompson v. Milburn, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 468 (La. 1823).
2. "Things which afford a ground of action if raised within a certain
time, may be pleaded at any time by way of exception." Ballentine, Law Dic-
tionary, 1059.
3. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law (1921) 558; Buckland, A Manual
of Roman Private Law (1928) 343, 369.
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modern Roman law, on the contrary, a specified term was for the
most part prescribed in every action that formerly had been per-
petual,4 but by invoking the rule of quae temporalia most of the
exceptions were made perpetual rights.
The exceptio was the Roman counterpart of our present day
exception and even in those days this was the proper method of
pleading quae temporalia. The exceptio was a defense which did
not deny the prima facie claim, but alleged some circumstances
which excluded it.' The exceptiones were classified in various
ways, but the most important distinction was between (1) excep-
tiones peremptoria (or perpetuae), which always obstructed the
plaintiff, destroyed the force of the action, and were available at
any time an action was brought,6 e.g. doU7 (in normal applica-
tions), metus,8 rei iudicatae,9 and (2) dilatoriae (or temporales),
which were available only within a certain time 0 and, appar-
ently, quae temporalia did not apply, e.g. litis dividuae,1 1 rei resi-
duae,1 2 pacti.13
4. Supra note 3.
5. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 395; Jolowicz, Historical
Introduction to Roman Law (1932) 209-210.
6. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 396.
7. "Any craft or deceit employed for the trapping of another." Buck-
land, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 329.
See also Cooper, Institutes of Justinian (1812) 368, § 9; Jolowicz, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 288; Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, 589.
8. "Action to remedy mischief where a man was compelled by threats to
go through a legal transaction, or, at least, to do any act detrimental to his
property rights." Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 328.
See also Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, 588; Cooper, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 368, § 9.
9. Modern writers have distinguished between what may be called the
"normal" function of the exceptio rei indicatae, and the "positive" function,
i.e., not merely a bar to the same action between the same parties, playing
the same parts, but as enforcing the principle, as between parties bound by
the judgment, that the content of the judgment must be assumed to be true.
Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, 689-693.
See also Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 396.
10. Supra note 6.
11. "The exceptio Zltio dividuae dealt with the case of one who, having a
claim which admitted of subdivision, e.g. a single contract for the sale of
two things, elected to sue on one part of it. He could not then sue on the
other part in the same magistracy; if he did, he was met by this exceptio."
Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, 649.
See also Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 396.
12. "One who having several claims against one person brought one or
more, but deferred others, so that they might go before different ludices,
could not sue on these in the same magistry, but would be met by the excep-
tNo rei residuae." Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, 649.
See also Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 396.
13. "An informal agreement not to sue, express or tacit." Buckland, A
Textbook of Roman Law, 569.
See also Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, 396.
NOTES ,
The actio redhibitoriaj 4 could be brought only within six
months of the date of the contract. 15 It was contended by some
authorities that the exceptio redhibitoria (essentially the same
action attempted in the principal case) was governed by the same
period of limitation;"6 but there appears to be no reason for ex-
cepting this case from the rule of quae temporalia.
Quae temporalia was adopted in French law to a limited ex-
tent.17 The Louisiana Supreme Court has often referred to the
French commentators, and most frequently to Troplong who said
that the only exceptions to which the rule applies are those which
are attached to the action and inseparable from the demand; in
other words, they must be visceral.', Troplong further estab-
lished three basic principles underlying this maxim: (1) If the
exception is in reality a disguised action by the defendant, the
rule should not apply. It is reserved for the true exception which
tends to modify the position of the plaintiff. (2) The defendant
can always form a reconventional demand to counterbalance the
principal demand; but a reconventional demand is not an excep-
tion, and the adage cannot be applied in such a case as it is re-
served for the visceral exceptions necessarily attached to the
action and inseparable from the demand. (3) This rule is to pro-
tect the possessor and if the defendant is not in possession of the
subject of the suit, the rule is not open to him. 9
The majority of the prominent French commentators, includ-
ing Toullier, 20 Huc," and Vazeille, 2 agreed with Troplong on the
basic principles set out above. Some commentators, chief among
14. Action to set aside the contract because of hidden defects at the time
of the sale. If a reduction of the price because of hidden defects was sought,
actio quanti minoris was the proper action. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman
Law, 488-491.
15. Moyle, Contract of Sale in the Civil Law (1892) 209-210.
16. Supra note 14.
17. All the French commentators agree that the maxim originated in
Roman law. Most of them say as did Duranton, "Le fondement de cette
maxime se trouve dane quelques ddcisions des lois romains, notament dans
la loi 5, § 6, ff. de doli mali except. Of le jurisconsulte Paul dit qu'il n'en est
pas de l'exception de dol comme de l'action de dol, qu'elle est perpdtuelle,
quoique l'action de dol soit limitde d un certain temps." 12 Duranton, Cours
de Droit Frangais (3 ed. 1834) 661-662, no 549.
18. .. . . elle est rdservde pour lea exceptions visc6rales, ndcessairement at-
tachdes 4 l'action et in sdparables de la demande." 2 Troplong, Droit Civil
Expliqu6, de la Prescription (4 ed. 1857) 404, no 833.
19. Id. at 401-404, nos 831-834.
20. 4 Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais (1833) 256-257, no 600.
21. 14 Huc, Commentaire Thorique et Pratique du Code Civil (1902) 550-
552, no 436.
22. Vazeille, Trait6 des Prescriptions (1834) 242-246, nos 566-572.
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whom were Laurent 3 and Marcad, 42 even though admitting the
adoption of the rule of quae temporalia by all the French courts,
thought that the rule was unsound. They were of the opinion that
it was contradictory to establish a prescriptive period for bring-
ing an action and at the same time to allow the exception to be a
perpetual right.2 5
It is interesting to notice that the rule has been adopted in
the Spanish law.26  Our Supreme Court once quoted from the
Spanish commentator Febrero, saying: "The rule is: Lo que tiene
tiempo limitado para demandarse in juicio, es perpetuo para ex-
ceptionarse."2
In Louisiana, the rule is used in its Latin phraseology and has
been applied when redhibition was urged as a defense to an ac-
tion for the purchase price;28 when an alleged deficiency in quan-
tity was pleaded against an action for the purchase price;29 and
when usury and fraud were urged in defense.80
In all the Louisiana cases that have adopted the rule of quae
temporalia, the original action has been instituted by the vendor
23. 32 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (2 ed. 1876) 56-57, no 57,
61-63, no 59; 20 Laurent, op. cit. supra, at 392-393, no 372.
24. 12 Marcad6, Explication Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed.
1874) 433-435, no LXIV.
25. Duranton discussed the maxim at length and came to the conclusion
that it was not intended to be conserved under the Code. 'Il i'y a pas ncoes-
sitM de dire que IVon a entendu conserver, sous Ie Code, la maxime, quae tem-
poralia.. ., dans les obligations annulables ou rescindables seulement dans un
certain temps." But he does not discuss the exceptions which merely modify
the position of plaintiff. 12 Duranton, Cours de Droit Frangais (3 ed. 1834)
661-669, at 669, no 549.
26. 3 Febrero, Libreria de Escribanos, n Instruccion Juridica Theorico
Prdctica de Principiantes (1790) 147-148, no. 250.
27. "The action which has a limited time for being brought in a suit is
perpetual when pleaded in defense as an exception."
Thompson v. Milburn, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 468, 469 (La. 1823).
28. Thompson v. Milburn, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 468 (La. 1823); Riddle v. Krein-
biehl, 12 La. Ann. 297 (1857); Davis v. Millaudon, 14 La. Ann. 868 (1859)
(which incidentally held that this maxim survived the great repealing act of
1828); Lastrapes v. Rocquet, 23 La. Ann. 67 (1871); Edwards and Kurz v.
Plaquemine Ice and Cold Storage Co., 46 La. Ann. 360, 15 So. 61 (1894);
Iberia Cypress Co. v. Von Schoeler, 121 La. 72, 46 So. 105 (1908); Holcomb
and Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Theodora, 1 La. App. 445 (1925); Pere v. Dalgarn, 3
La. App. 775 (1926); Rapides Grocery Co. v. Clopton, 171 La. 632, 131 So. 734
(1930); Phillip Werlein v. Glick, 154 So. 492 (La. App. 1934). See also Gilles-
pie v. Cammack, 3 La. Ann. 248 (1848); Walker v. Villavaso, 18 La. Ann. 715
(1866); Chadwick v. Menard, 104 La. 38, 28 So. 933 (1900); Roper v. Monroe
Grocer Co., 171 La. 181, 129 So. 811 (1930).
29. Davenport's Heirs v. Fortier, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 695 (La. 1825); Bushnell
v. Brown's Heirs, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 499 (La. 1826); Laflton v. Doiron, 12 La. Ann.
164 (1857). Cf. Rapides Grocery Co. v. Clopton, 171 La. 632, 131 So.* 734 (1930).
See also Gillespie v. Cammack, 3 La. Ann. 248 (1848).
30. Wright, Williams and Co. v. Hill and Co., 13 La. Ann. 233 (1858). But
see Cox v. McIntyre, 6 La. Ann. 470 (1851).
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to recover the purchase price and the doctrine has been invoked
by the vendee in an effort to reduce the price claimed by the
plaintiff. In Roman law the rule was invoked not only to reduce
the price but also to rescind the sale.3 1 The French commentators,
however, have frequently stated that the rule is to protect the
possessor and it should not be used in an affirmative manner to
further the defendant's position, as to rescind the sale, but simply
to protect his possession by diminishing the price.32 In France, by
pleading his defense under the rule, the defendant could not re-
cover money already paid to plaintiff; but he could, by such plea,
prevent the plaintiff's recovery of the amount of the purchase
price not yet paid 8 Although the Louisiana courts have referred
only to French commentators in discussing this problem, there is
stronger reason for considering the Roman law from which the
rule sprang.
If quae temporalia be invoked in a reconventional demand,
Article 375 of the Louisiana Code of Practice" requires it to be
"necessarily connected with and incidental to" the main demand
except where the plaintiff resides out of the state, or in the state
but in a different parish from the defendant. If the rule be in-
voked by way of exception, by reference to the French law and
the Roman law, the exception must be necessarily attached to the
action and inseparable from the demand.
In the principal case quae temporalia was not mentioned by
the court. Had it been followed, the fact that three years had
lapsed since the purchase and therefore the redhibitory action
was prescribed, would not preclude the defense based on a red-
hibitory defect brought in a reconventional demand.
The Louisiana courts have consistently held that the action
may be brought in a reconventional demand, but reference to the
French commentators reveals that the reconventional demand is
not an exception and therefore the rule should not be applied in
such a plea. It should be reserved for the visceral exceptions. In
pleading it as an exception three principles should be kept in
mind: (1) It must tend to modify the position of the plaintiff;
(2) it must be visceral; and (3) it must be invoked by the pos-
sessor.
The rule as it now stands is that although affirmative actions
31. Supra notes 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14.
32. Supra notes 18, 19, 20, and 21.
33. Supra note 31.
34. As amended by La. Act 50 of 1886.
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prescribe within certain specified terms, by invoking the rule
quae temporalia the same actions may be urged in defense in cer-
tain cases after the prescriptive period has lapsed. The correct
method of pleading the rule is in an exception, but the courts
have consistently permitted it to be brought by means of recon-
ventional demand. W. F. M. M., JR.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-SALE AND CONTRACT TO SELL DISTIN-
GUIsHED--Plaintiff contracted to sell bags to be used in the de-
fendant's sugar mill. Defendant failed to furnish the requisite
shipping instructions, rendering it impossible for plaintiff to de-
liver the bags. Therafter defendant discontinued its business op-
erations. Plaintiff, although the bags had not been supplied, sued
for the full purchase price. The defendant filed an exception of no
cause of action and, in the alternative, prayed that the plaintiff
be directed to redraft his petition in such a manner as to allege
the amount of damages actually suffered. The trial court's action
in overruling the exception and entering judgment for the plain-
tiff for the purchase price was affirmed on appeal, the defendant's
right to demand delivery of the sacks being specifically reserved
in the judgment. Mente & Company, Incorporated v. Roane Sug-
ars, Incorporated, 199 La. 686, 6 So. (2d) 731 (1942).'
A judgment for specific performance requires performance of
the contract as agreed.2 Ordinarily equity specifically enforces a
contract only when it regards the recovery of damages for its
breach an inadequate remedy.2 Throughout the course of devel-
opment of the doctrine 4 it is quite apparent that specific perform-
1. The court attempted to distinguish the instant case from the early case
of Mente & Co., Inc. v. Judice Co., Inc., 159 La. 183, 105 So. 283 (1925), involv-
ing a similar set of facts where an exception of no cause of action was sus-
tained. This earlier court held that the vendor should have first shipped the
bags before bringing its action. The basis upon which the court distinguishes
the two cases is that the contract involved in the instant case contained a
stipulation not found in the contract of the earlier case whereby the vendee
obligated himself to furnish the vendor with shipping instructions.
2. Throckmorton, Eaton on Equity (2 ed. 1923) 488, § 262.
3. McClintock, Equity (1936) 92, § 58; Pomeroy, Specific Performance of
Contracts (3 ed. 1926) 130, § 47; Throckmorton, op. cit. supra note 2, at 489, §
489; Walsh, Equity (1930) 299, § 58; Arts. 1926, 1927, La. Civil Code of 1870;
City of New Orleans v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R., 44 La. Ann. 64, 10 So. 401
(1892); Solomon v. Dienthal, 46 La. Ann. 897, 15 So. 183 (1894); Caddo Oil &
Mining Co. v. Producers' Oil Co., 134 La. 701, 64 So. 684 (1914); Fite v. Miller,
192 La. 229, 187 So. 650 (1939) (noted in (1939) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 198]
196 La. 876, 200 So. 285 (1941).
4. "In Roman law, the manus iniecto, the pignoris capio, and the missio,
the overburdened indemnity for damages (as far as the quadruplum), the
